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Abstract—XSTAMPP (eXtensible STAMP Platform ) is a
software tool developed to serve the widespread adoption and
use of STAMP methodologies in different domains. The first
version of XSTAMPP supported only the STPA application. In
this paper, we present a new version of XSTAMPP, including
CAST accident analysis and extended approach to STPA. We
developed two new plug-in tools called (1) A-CAST (Automated
CAST) which implements the CAST activities and (2) XSTPA
(Extended Approach to STPA) which supports automatically
generating the context tables which will be used to refine the
safety requirements and automatically transform the refined
safety requirements into a formal specification in Linear Tem-
poral Logic (LTL) to support verification activities. XSTAMPP
2.0 is available as an open source platform at our repository
http://sourceforge.net/projects/stampp/files/2.0.0/
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I. INTRODUCTION
STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Pro-
cesses) [7] is an accident model based on system and control
theory to safety engineering, which treats safety as a control
problem rather than a single component problem. STAMP
considers the system as an interaction of control loops
and accidents arise from the inadequate control of system
components or external disturbances within the interactions
with other components in the system environment such as
humans, organizations or other physical system components.
STAMP has two methodologies: STPA (Systems-Theoretic
Process Analysis) for safety analysis and CAST (Causal
Accident Analysis based on STAMP) for accident analysis.
STAMP methodologies have been successfully applied in
different areas in industry (e.g. STPA for security [11],
Interval Management in NextGen [5], Nuclear Power Plants
[10], and STPA for software safety [4].
To support the widespread adoption of STAMP, we have
developed a tool support called A-STPA [1] which was
our first prototype to implement the STPA activities and
provides tool support for the STPA application in different
domains. This prototype shows a number of shortcomings in
terms of drawing a complex control structure diagram and
documenting data in the tables. Moreover, A-STPA is a stand
alone version only for STPA application, and it does not have
the potential to support the other STAMP applications. To
overcome these shortcomings of A-STPA [1], we have de-
veloped an extensible platform called XSTAMPP [3] based
on our A-STPA tool to support the STPA application and
has potential to include new plug-ins for other approaches.
A. Problem Statement
The increase in the usage of STAMP methodologies
has fostered the need for developing a support tool to
assist safety engineers in performing the safety analysis as
well as the accident analysis. XSTAMPP has been already
being used by safety analysts in different industry domains.
However, the first version supported only STPA and had a
limitation in editing a large number of data.
B. Research Objectives
The overall objective of our research is to extend XS-
TAMPP to support other STAMP applications and new
improvements to STAMP. Moreover, we also aim to support
safety verification activities by automatically transforming
the STPA safety requirements into a formal specification
in LTL. Providing a formal specification of STPA safety
requirements will help safety analysts to verify design
models of the system and software against the STPA safety
requirements.
C. Contribution
The contribution of this research constitutes implementing
two plug-in tools supporting the application of CAST acci-
dent analysis (A-CAST) and the application of an extended
approach to STPA (XSTPA). We also used a combinatorial
testing algorithm [12] to automatically generate the context
tables. Moreover, we implemented an algorithm to trans-
form the refined safety requirements automatically into LTL
formulae.
II. XSTAMPP ARCHITECTURE
XSTAMPP is an open-source platform written in Java
based on the Eclipse Plug-in-Development Environment
(PDE)1 and Rich Client Platform (RCP)2. The RCP architec-
ture provides easy expandability and flexibility. XSTAMPP
1://www.eclipse.org/pde/
2https://wiki.eclipse.org/Rich Client Platform
Figure 1. The XSTAMPP Architecture
provides core functionality and components that make it
easy to extend with new plug-ins. XSTAMPP was developed
with the background to create a base platform support for
safety engineering, which can be easily extended with new
functions and approaches based on the STAMP model.
Figure 1 shows the main architecture of XSTAMPP. XS-
TAMPP provides three main components which are shared
by different plug-ins: 1) XSTAMPP models which represent
all STAMP components such as the STAMP data tables,
STAMP data lists, and STAMP text areas; 2) Main functions
of the platform such as the save, load and export functions;
and 3) the UI editors which are the user interface editors
to view each STAMP component in the main workbench.
XSTAMPP also provides an internal representation of each
STAMP model which is associated with an XML element
that documents the data of each component.
Figure 2 shows the main workbench of XSTAMPP which
is divided into three main parts: a project explorer, the
user interface viewer and the toolbox. The safety engineers
can use XSTAMPP to perform CAST accident analysis
and STPA safety analysis. They can create and open two
different types of XSTAMPP projects: STPA safety anal-
ysis and CAST accident analysis in the project explorer.
Any XSTAMPP project includes all necessary components
to document the results of applying STPA and CAST in
different domains such as fundamentals of analysis, drawing
the control structure diagram of the system, editing STAMP
data (i.e. the unsafe control actions, causal factors, safety
roles and responsibilities).
III. XSTAMPP PLUG-INS
The current version of XSTAMPP has three parts imple-
mented as Eclipse plug-ins: 1) The A-STPA plug-in which
supports the application of STPA safety analysis, 2) A-
CAST (Automated CAST) which is a tool that implements
the functionality of CAST and 3) XSTPA (extended STPA)
which is a tool that implements an extended approach
to STPA. XSTPA also implements an algorithm to auto-
matically transform safety requirements into LTL formal
specifications (see Algorithm 1).
A. A-STPA
A-STPA is an eclipse plug-ins based on the A-STPA
stand-alone version to support the application of STPA. In
XSTAMPP 2.0, we enhanced the usability and functionality
of A-STPA by removing the shortcomings of A-STPA. We
built a new editor for documenting a large number of unsafe
control actions and causal factors. Moreover, we improved
the drawing features of the control structure diagram by
implementing a new component as a dashed box component
to add comments or to group some components in one box
and a component of the control actions list in which the
safety analyst can draw and link multi-control actions to
one arrow.
B. A-CAST
A-CAST (Automated CAST) is our proposed tool which
we developed based on the XSTAMPP architecture to sup-
port performing the CAST accident analysis steps and to
help the analyst during investigating an accident based on
the STAMP model. CAST has the following main steps [7]:
• Identify the basis of analysis e.g. system-hazards which
are violated, the system safety design constraints and
proximal events.
• Construct the safety control structure as it was designed
to work.
• Accident analysis in which the analyst should evaluate
each component in the safety control structure diagram
and determine whether it fulfilled its responsibilities or
provided inadequate control. The analyst should also
examine the coordination and communication between
the main players of the accident under analysis.
• Generate recommendations.
A-CAST implements the aforementioned steps of CAST. It
allows the safety analyst to draw the control structure dia-
gram and document the safety responsibilities and roles of
each component in the control structure diagram. Moreover,
A-CAST allows the safety analyst to edit and document
recommendations for each component directly on the control
structure diagram by double-clicking on the component.
The results of the CAST accident analysis can be exported
completely in one PDF file or individually as PDFs, images,
and CVS files for each CAST step.
C. XSTPA
Thomas [9] proposed a new extended approach to STPA
for refining the unsafe control actions which are identified
in STPA Step 2 based on the combinations of process
model variables of each controller in the control structure
diagram. Suo and Thomas developed a prototype [8] called
STPA Tool to automate the extended approach to generate
the combinations of process model variables and refine the
Figure 2. The main workbensch of XSTAMPP
unsafe control actions. STPA Tool was presented in the 2014
STAMP workshop at MIT. However, at present there is no
version available of this prototype. Therefore, we developed
a tool support called XSTPA (Extended plug-in to STPA)
to automatically generate the set of combinations of process
model variables.
Abdulkhaleq and Wagner [2] developed an algorithm to
transform hazardous combinations in context tables into
the LTL specifications. We implemented this algorithm in
XSTPA to formalize the STPA safety requirements into LTL
specifications to be used for verification purposes such as
model checking or test case generation.
XSTPA is an Eclipse plug-in containing both algorithms.
It uses a combinatorial testing algorithm [12] to automati-
cally generate the context table and identify a minimal com-
bination of process model variables for large and complex
systems. XSTPA uses a Java library for the combinatorial
testing algorithm called ACTS3 which was developed by the
American National Institute of Standards and Technology to
generate combination sets of t parameters with n values.
When the safety analyst augments the process model into
a controller component in the control structure diagram view,
the XSTPA editor will automatically appear under the con-
trol structure diagram UI view with necessary information
about the controllers, their process model variables with
their values and the control actions on the control structure
diagram. Based on the transform algorithm (see Algorithm
1), the safety analyst has to choose which control action is
3http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/index.html
Algorithm 1 Transform Algorithm of STPA safety Require-
ments into LTL specification
Input: CAs : A list of control actions, PMVi,j : A table of
process model variables
⋃P and values
Data: Cos : Two contexts {Provided, Not Provided}
Output: LTL= A list of LTL specifications
Description:
1: for each control action CAi ∈ CAs do
2: for each context Coi ∈ Cos do
3: Define a dependence matrix Di = CAi × PMV
4: Construct an input text file Ni with ACTS format
5: ACTS ← Ni
6: Generate combination sets CSi =
⋃
(Pi,1∧ . . .Pi,n)
7: Evaluate each combination set f(
−→
CSi)
8: if f(
−→
CSi) is hazardous in the context Coi then
9: Check for any conflicted combination set in CS
10: if f(
−→
CSi) is not conflicted then
11: Refined Safety Requirements
−−→
SRi
12: SRi = (ΩCSi → (CAi ∨ ¬CAi))
13: LTLi ← G(SRi)
safety-critical to generate its context tables. Then, the safety
analyst has to determine the dependences D between the
control action and its relevant process model variables in
two contexts (Co1= providing and Co2 =not providing).
For each dependency relation, XSTPA will automatically
generate an input file N as input to the ACTS algorithm
to automatically generate the context tables of each safety-
critical control action. The input file of ACTS is a text file
with the following format [12]:
[System]
Name: ACC Adaptive Criuse Control
[Parameter]
ACC_Mode (enum): Standby, Cruise, Follow
Brake (enum) : NotApplied, Applied
Distance (enum): D>= safeDistance,
D<safeDistance
[Relation]
[Constraint]
ACC_Mode !=’Off’
The [System] section contains the information about the
STPA project and the [Parameter] section contains the
definition of process model variables and their values. All
process model variables are defined as enum data type to
accept different kinds of values of the process model vari-
ables. The [Relation] section is an optional section which
defines the strengths between the process model variables.
For example, the ACC system has 3 process model variables,
then the first relation can be created that consists of all the
process model variables with strength 1 or 2. The safety
analyst can define a custom relation when some process
model variables have a higher degree of interaction or they
are closely related to each other. The [Constraint] section
is an optional section which includes the boolean conditions
that combinations must satisfy to be valid. For instance,
the constraint (ACC Mode ! =’Off’) will exclude all rows
in the generated context table of process model variable
ACC Mode which contain the value off.
When the safety analyst clicks on the generate button
in the context table, XSTPA will automatically generate
the combinations of the process model variables CSi =⋃
(Pi,1 ∧ . . .Pi,n). From setting UI view, the safety analyst
can apply different combination coverages [6] on the gen-
erated results such as pairwise coverage or t-way coverage
to minimize the number of the combination sets. Pairwise
coverage means that for each 2 process model variables,
every possible combination of values of these 2 variables
must be covered in at least one combination. T-way coverage
means that for t process model variables, every possible
combination of values of these t variables must be covered
in at least one combination.
XSTPA can automatically show the conflicted combina-
tion sets. The conflicted combination sets mean that two or
more combination sets have the same values of the process
model variables in the both two contexts (providing and not
providing) of one control action. If the safety analyst selects
any combination as hazardous in any context, XSTPA will
automatically express them as boolean expressions with an
AND operator. Finally, the XSTPA will generate automati-
cally the LTL formulae of the hazardous combination sets
of a safety critical system. The results of XSTPA can also
be exported as PDFs, images and CVS sheets.
IV. NEW FEATURES OF XSTAMPP
XSTAMPP is already being used by safety analysts in
different industrial domains. Based on the feedback from
XSTAMPP’s users, we implemented new features to fa-
cilitate the use of XSTAMPP and improve the quality of
XSTAMPP. The new features that we included in the new
version 2.0 of XSTAMPP are listed below:
• XSTAMPP 2.0 runs on the Linux operating system
besides Windows and Mac OS X.
• XSTAMPP 2.0 has a new editor to enable the user to
document a large number of unsafe control actions and
causal factors.
• XSTAMPP 2.0 accepts any Eclipse plug-ins to run
under the XSTAMPP architecture to allow other re-
searchers to integrate their own tools in XSTAMPP.
• XSTAMPP 2.0 allows the users to create a different
kind of STAMP projects (e.g. STPA project and CAST
project).
• XSTAMPP 2.0 provides a button to generate the final
report and all the results of STAMP project and export
them into different formats.
• XSTAMPP 2.0 improves the quality of drawing the
control structure diagram by providing new additional
components and allowing the user to draw a link
between components from any point in the border of a
component.
• XSTAMPP 2.0 allows the users to copy and paste the
components in the control structure diagram.
• XSTAMPP 2.0 has a filter search option in each UI
editor to enable the user to search for data by using
different search criteria.
• With the new editor of the control structure diagram,
the user can link one or more control actions to
an arrow in the diagram. The information about the
source and destination of the control action will appear
automatically in the control actions table.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a new version of our XSTAMP plat-
form, including CAST accident analysis and the extended
approach to STPA to support the application of STAMP
methodologies in different industrial environments. The new
version aims at implementing the steps of STAMP/CAST to
support accident analysts in performing the STAMP/CAST
method. Moreover, the new version aims to provide a tool
support to generate the context tables and to generate the
corresponding formal specifications of the refined safety
requirements to support the safety verification activities.
Figure 3. The generated LTL specifications by XSTPA
We developed the STAMP platform based on the Eclipse
Rich Client Platform (RCP) as an extensible software plat-
form that can be extended in the future with new re-
quirements and improvements to STAMP. The platform is
implemented in Java as open source.
As future work, we aim to benefit from the new ar-
chitecture to implement a new plug-in called STPASec to
implement the steps of the STPA security approach [11]
and provide them in the upcoming version of the platform.
We also aim to support our safety engineering approach
for software-intensive systems [4] by developing a plug-
in called STPA verifier to enable the safety analyst to
verify their software design and implementation against
the STPA safety requirements which are transformed into
LTL formulae with XSTPA by using model checking and
generate a safety verification report. Providing a plug-in
which connects A-STPA with model checking in XSTAMPP
will enable the safety analysts to verify the system design
and software code against the STPA safety requirements.
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